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INTRODUCTION 
China’s long and sordid history of corruption and ineffectual 
enforcement in the field of intellectual property has been exten-
sively documented.1  With respect to the theft of intellectual prop-
erty rights, Myron A. Brilliant, vice president for Asia at the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, declared China public enemy number 
one,2 and the chairman of LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton, 
Bernard Arnault, has somberly reflected that China is an especially 
big headache.3  China is the world’s principal platform of produc-
tion and export in the counterfeit trade.4  In 2008, eighty-one peo-
ple across the United States died as a result of a Chinese-made 
counterfeit version of the drug heparin.5  In 2005, 69% of infring-
ing goods seized at the U.S. border were made in China.6  Their 
total value was $87.2 million.7  China’s share of infringing goods 
seized at the border is ten times greater than that of any other U.S. 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2883.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009; B.A., University of 
Southern California, 2006.  The author would like to thank Professors Andrew Kent and 
Susan Scafidi for their guidance and their comments on drafts of this paper.  She would 
also like to thank her friends and family for their unending support. 
1  See Amy M. Bunker, Deadly Dose: Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Prop-
erty and Human Health, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 493 (2007);  
Jane K. Winn & Song Yuping, Can China Promote Electronic Commerce Through Law 
Reform? Some Preliminary Case Study Evidence, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 415, 446 
(2007); Walt Bogdanich & Jake Hooker, From China to Panama, a Trail of Poisoned 
Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, at 1. 
2  Elizabeth Becker, Chamber of Commerce Asks U.S. to Crack Down on Chinese 
Copyright Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at C3 [hereinafter Becker, Chamber of 
Commerce]. 
3  Andrew Yeh, Investing in China: The Complex Trade in Luxury Fakes, FIN. TIMES 
OF ASIA, Apr. 19, 2006, at 10. 
4  Id. 
5  Editorial, The Frightening Heparin Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2008, at A22  
[hereinafter Heparin Case]; Gardiner Harris, U.S. Identifies Tainted Heparin in 11 Coun-
tries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2008, at A1 [hereinafter Harris, Tainted Heparin]. 
6  U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO 
COMPLIANCE 78 (2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/ 
Reports_Publications/2006/asset_upload_file688_10223.pdf. [hereinafter USTR 
REPORT]. 
7  Id. 
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trading partner.8  Chinese crime groups play a key role in this 
smuggling enterprise.9   
The economic impact of intellectual property theft on Ameri-
can businesses has been laboriously documented10 and is estimated 
to be approximately $250 billion annually.11  However, the na-
tional security threat posed by this deluge of counterfeits, espe-
cially those from China, remains largely overlooked.   
This Note employs a broad definition of national security.  In 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), national security is 
defined as “national defense, foreign relations, or economic inter-
ests of the United States.”12  While economic interests are not tra-
ditionally included in definitions of national security, it is signifi-
cant in light of the danger counterfeits pose to the U.S.  Congress 
also has recognized this broad interpretation of national security.  
For example, when drafting the statute that created the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”), Congress 
chose not to define the term national security.  Though CFIUS is 
tasked with reviewing the national security implications of Foreign 
Direct Investment in the United States,13 the Committee purpose-
fully left the meaning of national security undefined so that the 
term could be interpreted broadly.   
This Note exposes the failures of the executive branch to ad-
dress and monitor national security threats caused by the Chinese 
counterfeit industry, as well as the weakness of the statutory tools 
in addressing this problem.  This Note recommends several statu-
tory changes aimed at monitoring and addressing the national secu-
rity threats posed by counterfeit goods.  The general provisions 
which facilitate U.S.-China relations should provide for strict and 
 
8  Id. 
9  Julia Preston, U.S. Charges 51 with Chinatown Smuggling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 
2004, at B2. 
10  See generally U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, http://www.stopfakes.gov (last visited Oct. 
20, 2008) (chronicling seminars, news and reports concerning infringement issues). 
11  Carlos M. Gutierrez, U.S. Sec’y of Commerce, Remarks at AdvaMed Annual Con-
ference in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.commerce.gov/ 
NewsRoom/SecretarySpeeches/PROD01_004164.  
12  Jennifer Chacon, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and 
National Security, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1830 (2007). 
13  See infra notes 224–28 and accompanying text. 
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detailed monitoring of China’s enforcement of its intellectual 
property laws.  Potential national security threats caused by coun-
terfeits should be analyzed in the § 6951 reports to Congress,14 and 
in hearings before the United States–China Economic and Security 
Review Commission.  Finally, Congress should make use of the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to monitor 
threats posed by intellectual property theft. 
 Section I highlights the four areas of national security left vul-
nerable by a failure to address the trade in counterfeits stemming 
from China: consumer safety, economic safety, the financing of 
criminal organizations and terror groups and the proliferation of 
sensitive technologies.  Section II discusses China’s response to 
the production of counterfeits within its borders, and its history of 
enforcement of intellectual property laws.  Finally, Section III of-
fers prescriptions. 
I. FOUR AREAS OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY LEFT VULNERABLE 
BY CHINA’S TRADE IN COUNTERFEITS  
The United States faces a deluge of counterfeit products, the 
majority of which come from China.  It is estimated that since 
2003 about two-thirds of intellectual property–related seizures at 
the U.S. border have been goods made in China.15  Consumer 
safety, economic safety, the financing of criminal organizations or 
terrorist groups and the transfer of sensitive technology to foreign 
groups are four areas in which U.S. national security can be com-
promised by counterfeits.  
A. Consumer Safety 
Counterfeit goods pose an enormous risk to consumers, with 
the latest incident of counterfeit drugs leading to the death of 
eighty-one Americans.16  While the term national security is not 
 
14  See, e.g., USTR REPORT, supra note 6.  The § 6951 report to Congress  
is a report established by 22 U.S.C. § 6951 (2006), which mandates  
the United States Trade Representative to report annually to Congress on  
China’s compliance with its WTO commitments. 
15  Yeh, supra note 3. 
16  Heparin Case, supra note 5. 
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employed in a traditional manner when discussing consumer 
safety, it still falls within the broader understanding of national se-
curity under economic interests.  Perhaps one reason that consumer 
safety has been overlooked in determining national security threats 
is because the traditional definition of national security is not broad 
enough.  
The 2007 counterfeit toothpaste scare is a powerful illustration 
of how the security of consumers is put in jeopardy because of 
Chinese counterfeits.17  The danger posed by the counterfeit tooth-
paste was discovered when fifty-one-year-old Eduardo Arias of 
Panama City noticed that a tube of toothpaste at the drug store was 
prominently marked with “diethylene glycol” (“DEG”).18  He 
alerted the authorities.  DEG had caused several deaths in the 
country earlier in the year.19  DEG is a sweet-tasting yet toxic sub-
stitute for glycerin.20  And while glycerin is a common ingredient 
in medicine, food and household products,21 DEG, a central nerv-
ous system depressant and a kidney and liver toxin,22 poses a seri-
ous risk of injury, especially in children.23  The tainted toothpaste 
was manufactured in China24 and incorrectly labeled Colgate.25  
Some shipments of this toothpaste were detained at the U.S. border 
and analyzed by the FDA.26  But the toothpaste found its way to 
prisoners in U.S. jails and wealthy patrons in high-end hotels.27  It 
was used by the mentally disabled, troubled youths and patients in 
 
17  Walt Bogdanich, The Everyman Who Exposed Tainted Toothpaste, N.Y. TIMES,  
Oct. 1, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Bogdanich]. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Urgent Voluntary Nationwide Recall of 
Toothpaste (June 8, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/firmrecalls/ 
goldcity06_07.html [hereinafter FDA Recall]. 
23  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA ADVISES CONSUMERS TO AVOID TOOTHPASTE 
FROM CHINA CONTAINING HARMFUL CHEMICAL (June 1, 2007) [hereinafter FDA 
ADVISES]. 
24  Id.  
25  Kristin Graham, Is China’s Growth Counterfeit?, MOTLEY FOOL, Aug. 6, 2007, 
http://www.fool.com/investing/international/2007/08/06/is-chinas-growth-counterfeit. 
aspx. 
26  FDA ADVISES, supra note 23. 
27  Bogdanich, supra note 17. 
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hospitals.28  It eventually reached thirty-four countries, including 
the United States, Vietnam, Kenya, Nigeria and Canada.29  The 
damage done by counterfeits does not discriminate. 
China’s first response was to defend the manufacturers who 
used DEG.  China stated that the substance was used as a thicken-
ing agent in toothpaste and caused no health problems among Chi-
nese consumers.30  Dora Akunyili, who runs Nigeria’s National 
Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control,31 ridiculed 
the Chinese response, remarking, “They should apologize to the 
world, and not say that it is not dangerous.”32  Still, even worse 
was yet to come: tainted medicines from China were already slip-
ping across U.S. borders, and these medicines, unlike the tooth-
paste, were fatal.  
Leroy Hubley lost his wife and son within a few weeks of each 
other; both were poisoned by counterfeit drugs.  His loved ones 
had a genetic kidney disease that required constant dialysis and a 
medicine known as heparin.33  They unknowingly received Chi-
nese-made heparin that was tainted with a cheap chemical substi-
tute.34  Hubley was not the only one to suffer such a loss.  During 
2007 and 2008, eighty-one people across the United States were 
killed by tainted Chinese-made heparin.35  The heparin, a common 
blood thinner often given to dialysis patients, was tainted with 
chemicals that are known to cause a severe decrease in blood pres-
sure or an allergic reaction.36  It was manufactured by Changzhou 
SPL, a Chinese subsidiary of Scientific Protein Laboratories,37 and 
shipped to eleven countries—Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, 
 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  See NFDAC Nigeria, http://www.nafdacnigeria.org/dg.html (last visited Oct. 20, 
2008).  
32  Bogdanich, supra note 17. 
33  Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Says Drug Contamination May Have Been Deliberate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at A11 [hereinafter Harris, Contamination]. 
34  Id. 
35  See Heparin Case, supra note 5. 
36  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BAXTER’S MULTIPLE-DOSE VIAL HEPARIN LINKED TO 
SEVERE ALLERGIC REACTIONS (Feb. 11, 2008); see also Heparin Case, supra note 5;  
Harris, Contamination, supra note 33; Harris, Tainted Heparin, supra note 5. 
37  Harris, Contamination, supra note 33. 
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France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand and 
the United States.38   
The deadly contaminant was identified as oversulfated chon-
droitin sulfate, a cheap chemical substitute for heparin.39  Heparin 
costs $900 a pound, but oversulfated chondroitin sulfate costs a 
mere $9 a pound,40 figures FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von 
Eschenbach surely had in mind when he referred to the contami-
nated drugs as a product of “economic fraud.”41  The fact that the 
cheap chemical substitute was involved pointed to involvement by 
Chinese counterfeiters;42 however, while China admitted that the 
tainted heparin originated in its factories, it denied that the medi-
cine had caused any deaths.43  David G. Strunce, CEO of Scientific 
Protein Laboratories, testified before a Senate subcommittee that 
he was stopped by Chinese authorities when he tried to find the 
original source of the contaminated drugs.44  And so, only months 
after the counterfeit toothpaste scare, another cheap chemical sub-
stitute from China arrived to pose a serious health risk to consum-
ers.45  Though the counterfeit toothpaste did not cause any deaths, 
the tainted heparin led to eighty-one fatalities.  Could these be the 
first instances in an endless wave of potentially deadly counterfeit 
products? 
Dangerous counterfeits are not a recent development.  Manu-
facturing firms are creating dangerous chemical imitations of 
pharmaceuticals made to look like Lipitor.46  In 2002, New York 
authorities broke up a fake Viagra distribution ring originating in 
China.47  The products were a perfect imitation of the real thing, 
and even pharmacists could not discern between fake and real 
 
38  Harris, Tainted Heparin, supra note 5. 
39  Id.; see Walt Bogdanich, Heparin Is Now Suspected in 62 Fatalities Across U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at A17 [hereinafter Bogdanich, Heparin Suspected]. 
40  Harris, Contamination, supra note 33.  
41  See id. 
42  Bogdanich, Heparin Suspected, supra note 39. 
43  Harris, Contamination, supra note 33; Harris, Tainted Heparin, supra note 5.  
44  Harris, Contamination, supra note 33. 
45  See supra notes 16–27 and accompanying text. 
46  Graham, supra note 25. 
47  Natasha Wong, Counterfeit Medicine: Is It Curing China?, 5 ASIAN-PAC. L. & 
POL’Y J. 155, 180 (2004).  
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pills.48  Since 2000, FDA investigations of counterfeit drugs have 
increased by over 20%.49  Consumer danger does not stop at toilet-
ries and prescription drugs.  In Los Angeles, buyers can find coun-
terfeit brake pads, aircraft parts, cough syrup and even baby for-
mula.50 
B. Economic Safety 
The INA definition of national security and the broad interpre-
tation of national security granted by CFIUS support an interpreta-
tion of the term51 that places high value on protecting the eco-
nomic interests of the United States.  Counterfeits affect the U.S. 
economy in two main ways.  First, counterfeit currency imported 
into the United States, and possibly laundered through Chinese as-
sets, lowers the confidence in the U.S dollar.  Second, as counter-
feit products harm consumers, the resulting scandals tarnish the 
reputation of corporations whose names were falsely placed on the 
1. Confidence in the U.S. Money Supply is Weakened 
In 2006, FBI agents, acting on a tip, discovered nearly flawless 
counterfeit one hundred-dollar bills in false-bottomed compart-
ments of shipping containers entering the U.S. from China.52  
These so-called “supernotes” are believed to be manufactured in 
North Korea, though the containers originated in China.53  Millions 
of dollars in fake currency have already been seized.54  A senior 
government official stated that the counterfeit currency could breed 
 
48  Graham, supra note 25. 
49  New Initiatives Take on Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals, INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., 
Aug. 8, 2003, http://www.iccwbo.org/icccbie/index.html. 
50  Counterfeit Goods: Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 11 (2005) [hereinafter 
Counterfeit Goods Hearing], available at http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/109s/ 
21823.pdf.  Investigative Consultants is a licensed private investigation firm based in 
Southern California that specializes in investigating counterfeit goods. See id. at 1; Inves-
tigative Consultants, http://www.investigativeconsultants.com/html/home.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2008). 
51  See supra note 12 and infra notes 225–28. 
52  Stephen Mihm, No Ordinary Counterfeit, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, at 636. 
53  Id. 
54  See id.  
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mistrust in the dollar because it is very difficult to tell the notes 
apart from the real thing.55  The same senior official stated that un-
der international law, the traffic in counterfeit cu
rpreted as a hostile act against another state.56 
A year before the supernotes were discovered, North Korea 
was involved in a counterfeiting incident in Macau, a special ad-
ministrative region controlled by China.  In September 2005, U.S. 
law enforcement personnel shut down a major North Korean 
money-laundering operation taking place through Macau-based 
Banco Delta Asia.57  When asked if China was also being investi-
gated in the operation, a U.S. Treasury spokesperson refused to 
comment.58  A source reported that following the shutdown, North 
Korea moved their assets to a Chinese State-owned
2. Confidence in U.S. Products Is Weakened 
Corporations troll the globe for cheap labor to lower costs and 
increase profits.60  For this reason, much manufacturing has been 
outsourced to China.61  However, this outsourcing could cost the 
corporation the success of its brand names.62  For example, during 
the counterfeit toothpaste scare, some of the products containing 
DEG were found to be sold under the names Colgate and Sen-
sodyne.63  Counterfeit Colgate toothpaste containing DEG was 
found in discount stores in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania 
and Maryland.64  Other corporations, such as Gold City Enterprise 
 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  John Tkacik, Is China Complicit in North Korean Currency Counterfeiting?, 
HERITAGE FOUND., Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/ 
wm1046.cfm.  
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  See, e.g., Pete Engardio et al., The Future of Outsourcing, BUS. WEEK, Jan. 30, 
2006, at 50. 
61  See Traci Purdum & John Teresko, Smart Outsourcing, INDUSTRY WEEK,  
Oct. 1, 2004, at 71. 
62  Graham, supra note 25. 
63  Bogdanich, supra note 17. 
64  Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Counterfeit Colgate Toothpaste Found 
(June 14, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/firmrecalls/colgate06_07.html. 
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caught, the criminals are likely to only receive probation, whereas 
                                                
and MainStar America, were forced to institute nationwide recalls 
of their products.65  Sensodyne tracked the counterfeit toothpaste 
to a factory in the Shejiang P
6
Financing of Criminal Organizations and Terror Groups 
A critical part of protecting America from terror groups and 
criminal organizations is to end their funding.67  As government 
authorities have cracked down on terror-financing schemes involv-
ing banks and charities, terror groups have turned to a trade in 
counterfeit consumer goods.68  Insistent vendors on the sidewalks 
of metropolises, offering the seemingly innocuous faux Prada 
handbags or Hello Kitty T-shirts may be part of a larger terrorist-
funding operation linked to groups such as Hezbolla or Hamas.69  
Interpol has confirmed that the worldwide counterfeit trade has be-
come a low-cost, high-return enterprise favored by terrorist organi-
zations such as Hezbolla.70  What makes this trade particularly at-
tractive is that the penalties and risks of getting caught are low, 
while the moneymaking potential is enormous.71  Even when 
 
65  FDA Recall, supra note 22; Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., MainStar 
America, LLC Issues Urgent Voluntary Nationwide Recall of Toothpaste (June 13, 
2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/firmrecalls/mainstar06_07.html.  Among 
the recalled products were Shir Fresh Mint Fluoride and Dr. Cool Toothpaste. Id. 
66  Bogdanich, supra note 17. 
67  See, e.g., Juan C. Zarate, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Key-
note Address at the Ninth Annual American Express Anti-Money Laundering Conference 
(June 23, 2004), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1754.htm. 
68  Lara Jakes Jordan, Knockoff Profits May Support Terror, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 
26, 2005, at A5; see also Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 2 (statement of 
Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Af-
fairs). 
69  Jordan, supra note 68; Yeh, supra note 3. 
70  Yeh, supra note 3; Chinese Fakes Cost Firms Trillions: Exports of Counterfeit 
Japanese Goods to Middle East on the Rise, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 5, 2007, at 2 [hereinaf-
ter DAILY YOMIURI].  Testifying before Congress in 2003, the Secretary General of Inter-
pol confirmed that piracy of goods has become a preferred fundraising method for terror-
ist organizations, and he mentioned groups such as Hezbollah, Chechen rebels and al 
Qaeda. Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 2 (statement of Sen. Susan M. 
Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs). 
71  See Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 3 (statement of Sen. Joe Lieber-
man). 
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if they were selling drugs instead, they would go to jail.72  Chinese 
counterfeits specifically are exported through Middle Eastern 
countries.73  To combat Chinese counterfeits of Japanese goods, 
Japanese firms have hired investigators.74  Among their finds were 
35,000 counterfeit Nissan sparkplugs in the United Arab Emir-
ates.75 
In hearings before the U.S. Senate, Senator Lieberman recog-
nized the importance of approaching counterfeits from a national 
security perspective.76  He cited an unclassified FBI document 
which revealed that Hezbollah used the sale of counterfeit goods to 
raise cash in the United States.77  Senator Susan Collins pointed 
out that it does not take a large sum of money to carry out devastat-
ing terrorist attacks.78  The Senator used the example of the 9/11 
attacks, which is estimated to have cost only $500,000.79  The 
1993 bombing attack on the World Trade Center only cost an esti-
mated $10,000.80  Shortly after the bombing the FBI investigated 
whether profits made through the sale of counterfeit T-shirts were 
used to finance the attack.81  These relatively modest sums could 
easily be raised by such organizations through the sale of counter-
feit goods.82  In Los Angeles, for example, when officers entered a 
home to serve an intellectual property right (“IPR”) warrant, they 
found a chilling scene.  Small Hezbollah flags decorated the sus-
pect’s bedroom, which was also adorned with a portrait of Hassan 
Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah.83  The home contained dozens 
of tapes with Nasrallah’s speeches, and a locket with two pictures, 
 
72  Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 13 (statement of Kris Buckner, Presi-
dent, Investigative Consultants). 
73  DAILY YOMIURI, supra note 70. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  See Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 3 (statement of Sen. Joe  
Lieberman). 
77  Id. 
78  Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 3 (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs).  
79  Id. 
80  Larry Light, Why Counterfeit Goods May Kill, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 2, 1996, at 6. 
81  Id. 
82  See id. 
83  Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 8 (statement of John C. Stedman, 
Lieutenant, County of Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department). 
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one of the suspect and one of Nasrallah.84  During the search, the 
suspect’s wife stated that they love Nasrallah because “he protects 
us from Jews.”85   
D. Proliferation of Sensitive Technology 
The Business Software Alliance (“BSA”)86 estimates that 92% 
of business software in China is pirated.87  This trade leads to a de-
crease in value of American brands and can weaken confidence in 
U.S. products.88  More dangerous, though, is the piracy of software 
that can be used for military purposes.89   
 
84  Id.  
85  Id.  The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department shares a very close relationship with the 
Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force because IPR warrants so often lead to evidence 
of possible terrorism.  This information relating to terrorist financing is passed on from 
the Sheriff’s Department to the Task Force. Id. 
86  The BSA is respected as the foremost organization dedicated to promoting a safe 
and legal digital world.  It often serves as the voice for its many members, which include 
Adobe, Apple, Autodesk, Avid, Bentley Systems, Borland, CNC Software/Mastercam, 
McAfee, Microsoft, PTC, SolidWorks, Sybase, Symantec, The MathWorks and UGS.  
The goals of the BSA are to promote technology innovation through education and policy 
initiatives, as well as to promote copyright protection, cyber security, trade and e-
commerce. See BSA, About BSA & Members, http://www.bsa.org/country/ 
BSA%20and%20Members.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).  The BSA has been known 
to bring suits on behalf of its members against companies found to have unlicensed soft-
ware on their computer. See Press Release, BSA, BSA Conducts Record Global Anti-
Piracy Enforcement Action (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www. 
bsa.org/country/News%20and%20Events/News%20Archives/en/2007/en-09182007-
globalsettlement.aspx.  The BSA estimates that 35% of software installed on personal 
computers worldwide is pirated, equaling approximately $40 billion in global losses to 
companies. BSA, 2007 Global Piracy Study, http://w3.bsa.org/globalstudy (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2008).  In 2006, 55% of software installed on personal computers in the Asia 
Pacific region was pirated. See id. 
87  See Press Release, BSA, Major Study Finds 53 Percent of Software in Use in Asia 
Pacific Region Is Pirated (July 7, 2003) (on file with author), available at 
http://w3.bsa.org/asia-eng/press/newsreleases/Major-Study-Finds-53-Percent-of-
Software-in-Use-in-Asia-Pacific-Region-is-Pirated.cfm.  
88  See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 18 (2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/12/38707619.pdf. 
89  See John Schwartz, Black Market for Software Is Sidestepping Export Controls, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, at C1. 
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Intelligent Light is an engineering company that creates soft-
ware so powerful that it is bound by export controls.90  Before the 
Internet became the company’s primary software distribution 
mechanism, its president would receive letters, handwritten and 
bearing stamps from Iraq, which read, “We have heard of your 
beautiful software. . . .  We would like to buy it.”91  Since the ad-
vent of the Internet, these letters have stopped arriving.  Despite 
export controls, bootlegged copies of Intelligent Light’s software 
have been found to be sold over the Internet by Chinese “entrepre-
neurs” for two hundred dollars apiece.92  A popular business 
method for software pirates is to use Internet auction sites to sell 
their illicit goods.93 
The Internet has facilitated the emergence of a black market for 
powerful scientific and engineering software. 94  Encryption tech-
nology, for example, in hardware or software form, helps scramble 
computer data such as e-mail or database information, to keep it 
private.95  The proliferation of encryption technology was deemed 
such a serious risk to national security that the Clinton administra-
tion tried to limit its exportation.96  Exportation of this technology 
remains heavily controlled through the Arms Export Control Act 
of 197697 and the International Trade in Arms Regulations 
(“ITAR”).98  Indeed, cryptographic software is specifically listed 
on the ITAR munitions list.99  Export licensing and export controls 
 
90  See id.  Intelligent Light is based out of Lyndhurst, N.J. and creates software for 
computational fluid dynamics. See id.; FieldView: About Intelligent Light, 
http://www.ilight.com/about.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
91  See Schwartz, supra note 89.  The President of Intelligent Light is Jeanne L.  
Mara. Id. 
92  Id. 
93  BSA, Internet Software Piracy Fact Sheet, http://w3.bsa.org/ireland/antipiracy/ 
upload/Internet-Piracy-Factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).  
94  See Schwartz, supra note 89. 
95  BSA, Electronic Signatures, http://www.bsa.org/country/Public%20Policy/Security/ 
Related%20Issues/Electronic%20Signatures.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).  
96  See Schwartz, supra note 89. 
97  22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2006). 
98  Stuart Schwartzstein, Export Controls on Encryption Technology, 16 SAIS REV. 13, 
15 (1996), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v016/16.1schwartzstein. 
html.  
99  Id. 
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were a major tool for preventing proliferation; however, with the 
prevalence of Internet piracy, these controls have become moot.100  
Despite encryption technology’s strict regulations, there are 
even more serious technologies being proliferated.101  Software 
powerful enough to design missiles and nuclear reactors, or predict 
the path of a cloud of anthrax spores, is being readily prolifer-
ated.102  A Justice Department official confirmed that software 
used to model the fuel flow in a fighter jet is being sold on the 
World Wide Web.103  With a simple wire transfer, such software 
can slip past national barriers with great ease.104   
II. CHINA’S ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS 
HAS BEEN WEAK 
A. China Has Clashed with the U.S. in the Past over the Weak 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
China has failed to aggressively enforce intellectual property 
rights and combat the counterfeit and piracy epidemic in its na-
tion.105  The United States and China have clashed over the issue 
of counterfeit materials for over a decade.106  For example, in 1995 
the Chinese Government refused to shut down twenty-nine facto-
ries which illegally produced approximately seventy million copies 
of American films and software every year.107  Fed up with the 
rampant piracy, the Clinton administration threatened to block 
China’s effort to join the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).108  
 
100  See Schwartz, supra note 89. 
101  See id. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  See id. 
105  See id. 
106  See, e.g., Seth Faison, U.S.-China Talks over Piracy Fail, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
1996, at A1; David Lague, U.S. Presses Chinese on Piracy, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 
14, 2006, at 15. 
107  David Sanger, U.S. Threatens $2.8 Billion of Tariffs on China Exports, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 1, 1995, at 14. 
108  See id. 
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ressing the national 
security dangers posed by counterfeit goods.  
                                                
Today, major intellectual property enforcement issues in China 
have yet to be resolved, and in 2007 the United States filed a for-
mal WTO piracy complaint against China.  The United States 
sought to establish a dispute settlement panel focused on the en-
forcement of copyrights and trademarks and cited serious deficien-
cies in China’s legal regime.109  In part, the complaint is directed at 
China’s high quantitative threshold of infringement that must be 
met before prosecution proceedings can be launched.  Distributors 
of counterfeit goods who operate below the thresholds can do so 
without fear of criminal liability.110  These thresholds effectively 
function as safe harbor provisions.111  Further, if Chinese authori-
ties discover counterfeit goods, they will release the goods back 
into the stream of commerce once the fake label is removed.112  
This contravenes WTO rules, which state that the goods should be 
kept out of the marketplace.113  Lastly, the complaint discusses the 
Chinese practice of not offering copyright protection for works that 
have yet to receive censorship approval.114  While legal distribu-
tors cannot sell the works, pirates have no such qualms.115  It is 
critical that copyright protection for new works be immediatel
nted. 
It is important to note that the issue of national security is not 
brought up in the complaint.116  While the WTO is an organization 
specifically directed at trade between nations, this omission is a re-
flection of the overall U.S. deficiency in add
 
109  Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., United States Requests WTO Panel in 
Case Challenging Deficiencies in China’s Intellectual Property Rights Laws (Aug. 13, 
2007) (on file with author), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_ 
Library/Press_Releases/2007/August/United_States_Requests_WTO_Panel_in_Case_ 
Challenging_Deficiencies_in_Chinas_Intellectual_Property_Rights_Laws.html. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  See id. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. 
115  See id. 
116  See id. 
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125  
More recently, after the counterfeit toothpaste crisis, the Chinese 
B. Chinese Legal Efforts in Combating Intellectual Property Theft 
In the last few years, China has made several efforts to pass 
laws and enter into agreements that protect intellectual property.  
For example, the Clinton Administration reached multiple agree-
ments with China aimed at ending the counterfeiting of tapes, 
movies and compact disks.117 
In anticipation of joining the WTO, China first joined the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, and acceded to its IP 
treaties,118 including the Paris Convention, dealing with patents 
and trademarks;119 the Madrid Agreement, concerning the registra-
tion of trademarks;120 the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Re-
spect of Integrated Circuits, protecting layout-design;121 and the 
Berne Convention, pertaining to copyrights.122  High contracting 
parties to the treaties rea  bound to enforce them through the im-
plementation of domestic laws throughout their territory.  China 
became a member of the WTO on December 11, 2001, after fifteen 
years of negotiations.123 
 The agreements do not end there.  On April 21, 2004, the 
Bush administration, during a day-long trade meeting, received 
several concessions from the Chinese government.124  Among 
them was China’s agreement to increase the range of activities that 
are subject to criminal penalties for intellectual property violations.  
These new penalties would apply to the import, export, storage as 
well as the distribution of pirated and counterfeit products.
                                                 
117  Elizabeth Becker, China Agrees to Postpone Wireless Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 
 its IP Enforce-
 20, 
l Registration of Marks art. 1, Apr. 
llectual Property in 
nization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty pmbl., Dec. 20, 
 
ker, China Agrees, supra note 117. 
2004, at C1 [hereinafter Becker, China Agrees]. 
118  Kate Colpitts Hunter, Here There Be Pirates: How China is Meeting
ment Obligations Under TRIPS, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 523, 532 (2007). 
119  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property arts. 1, 6bis, Mar.
1883, revised, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, T.I.A.S. No. 6903, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.  
120  Madrid Agreement Concerning the Internationa
14, 1891, revised, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389. 
121  World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Treaty on Inte
Respect of Integrated Circuits art. 2, May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477.  
122  World Intellectual Property Orga
1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, 1997 WL 79494.
123  Hunter, supra note 118, at 533. 
124  Bec
125  Id. 
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tter books with titles like “Harry Potter and the Big Fun-
nel,” and “Rich Dad, Poor Dad and Harry Potter.”136  In fact, in 
                                                
government promised to reform their regulatory system for
126icine and consumer products.   
C. Obstacles to Intellectual Property Enforcement in China 
China has a long history of corruption and ineffectual enforce-
ment in the field of intellectual property, and a widespread culture 
of industrial counterfeiting and fraud.127  China’s citizens suffer 
most from China’s counterfeit industry.128  Leaders of China’s 
State Food and Drug Administration have admitted that their 
pharmaceutical market is awash in fake and deadly drugs.129  
China’s markets are flooded with fake antibiotics, vaccines, drugs 
for erectile dysfunction130 and blood products.131  Even medicine 
aimed at strengthening the immune system has been counterfeited 
and sold as authentic.132  The total cost in human lives of this bro-
ken system cannot be estimated, even by the Chinese gove
133t;  however, in 2001, the Shenzhen Evening News, a gov-
ernment-controlled newspaper, estimated that 192,000 people died 
in China that year because of fake pharmaceutical products.134  
There are endless illustrations of the pervasive counterfeit 
problem in China.  Among them are plastic bottles refilled with tap 




a, A Chinese Reformer Betrays His Cause, and Pays, N.Y. TIMES, 
007, at A1.  
a’s Economic Revival Is Minted in Counterfeit, INT’L HERALD 
oza, supra note 128. 
China’s Killer Headache: Fake Pharmaceuticals, WASH. POST, 
ch, supra note 131. 
126  Bogdanich, supra note 17. 
127  Peter Allgeier, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.,  
Statement on Trade Policy Review of China given in Geneva, Switz.  
(Apr. 19, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/ 
2006/April/Tra
_printer.html. 
128  See David Barboz
July 13, 2
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  Howard French, Chin
TRIB., Aug. 4, 2007, at 2.  
132  Barb
133  Id. 
134  Peter Goodman, 
Aug. 30, 2002, at A1. 
135  Fren
136  Id. 
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h se criminal enter-
pris
out that despite rampant copyright infringement, China’s Olympic 
na there are more copies of fake Harry Potter books than real 
ones.137 
China faces considerable hurdles in enforcing the many intel-
lectual property laws and agreements it has enacted.  Chief among 
them are corrupt officials.  The accusations of widespread local 
corruption in China are not new.  In 1995, while twenty-nine facto-
ries in southern China were busy churning out illegal copies of 
American videotapes and software, Chinese central government of-
ficials were bemoaning their lack of influence in the region.138  
The officials stated that they had too little control over the region 
to put an end to this piracy.139  Rejecting the Chinese argument as 
preposterous, the U.S. stated that China faces a “failure of will . . . 
not a failure of ability,” when it comes to enforcement of copyright 
laws.140  As evidence for this statement, the U.S. pointed out that 
many of the counterfeiting enterprises were in fact run by central 
government officials and were closely tied to local and national po-
litical leaders.141  If so, corrupt Chinese officials would have no in-
centive to enforce the copyright laws that would tighten their 
spigot of profits from pirated goods.  In 2006, Ambassador Peter 
Allgeier stated clearly that local corruption is one of the main fac-
tors that contribute to widespread intellectual property theft.142  
And when the FBI conducted a study of C ine
es, it cited corruption at a local level as an important factor in 
smuggling of counterfeit and pirated goods.143    
However, in hearings before Congress, a commissioner of the 
U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission pointed 
                                                 
137  Id. 
138  Sanger, supra note 107, at 14.  Piracy was so widespread even as far back as 1995 
ed copies of the videotape of Disney’s The Lion King were being distributed in 
 released in the United States. Id. 
that pirat
China before the tape was even
139  Id. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Allgeier, supra note 127. 
143  See Ning-Ning Mahlmann, Chinese Criminal Enterprises, in ASIAN CRIMINAL 
ENTERPRISE PROGRAM OVERVIEW: A STUDY OF CURRENT FBI ASIAN CRIMINAL 
ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1999). 
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source of luxury fakes, such as clothing, 
han
                                                
mascot had yet to be counterfeited.144  He implied that China can 
in fact enforce its intellectual property laws, if it so chooses.145  
Today, the production of counterfeits is primarily concentrated in 
China’s southern provinces.146  Guangdong, for example, has be-
come the world’s primary 
dbags and watches.147 
  Institutionalized corruption led to the greatest food and drug 
scandal in China and the execution of one of its top officials.  
Zheng Xiaoyu was once China’s most powerful regulator and the 
creator of its Food and Drug Administration.148  Intent on improv-
ing standards in China’s pharmaceutical industry, the newly cre-
ated agency cracked down on fake drugs and illegal factories.149  
However, while the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approves 
about 140 new drugs each year, Mr. Zheng’s agency approved over 
150,000 during his eight-year tenure.150  This high approval rate 
was a consequence of Mr. Zheng receiving more than $850,000 in 
gifts and bribes from pharmaceutical companies seeking special 
favors.151  The Supreme People’s Court found Mr. Zheng guilty of 
accepting bribes, and on July 5, 2007, Mr. Zheng was executed.152  
Other efforts to combat corruption have been less brutal.  China 
has sought to improve judges’ salaries and create clear rules re-
garding gift-giving.153  Still, there is a large market for counterfeits 
in China, particularly because the Chinese government limits the 
 
nd China: Hearing Before the U.S.-China  
c. Review Comm’n, 110th Cong. 19 (2007) [hereinafter Proliferation]  
l R. Wessel, Comm’r, U.S.-China Econ. & Sec.  
omm’n), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/transcripts/ 
ns.pdf. 
id. 
, supra note 3.  
144  See China’s Proliferation and the Impact on Trade Policy on Defense  





145  See 
146  Yeh
147  Id. 
148  Barboza, supra note 128. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  Id.  Indeed, when fake drugs and illegal factories are discovered, corrupt local offi-
cials often try to protect companies in their area from punishment. See id. 
152  Id. 
153  Hunter, supra note 118, at 544. 
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y m is ill-
suit
T  legal system now faces long delays due to a short-
rop-
D. 
ortation of legitimate recordings and movies; this leaves a huge 
gap in demand, which is primarily filled with counterfeit goods.154   
Some scholars have hypothesized that another problem with 
enforcement lies in the Chinese intellectual property legal system 
itself, which places emphasis on compromise and harmony, inclin-
ing it toward mediation and arbitration.155  Such a s ste
ed for the strong litigation that is necessary to enforce and de-
fend intellectual property rights in a market economy.156   
Among other legal problems with enforcement is China’s very 
high threshold for criminal prosecution of intellectual property vio-
lations.157  The infringement has to be on a very large scale in or-
der for the government authorities to bring criminal charges.158  
This effectively creates “safe harbor” provisions for criminals.159  
In addition, communism decimated the legal profession in 
China.160  he
age of qualified legal personnel able to take on intellectual p
erty cases.161 
China’s Response when Attacked on Intellectual Property 
Issues 
When faced with accusations regarding its counterfeit industry, 
China does not usually respond constructively.  Instead of address-
ing the main problem, China historically goes on the attack.  For 
example, in reaction to the United States’ 1995 threat of $2.8 bil-
lion in sanctions for China’s refusal to close down twenty-nine pi-
racy factories, China immediately threatened to take counter-
retaliatory measures.162  In its response, China threatened, among 
                                                 
154  Becker, Chamber of Commerce, supra note 2 (“By limiting the import of legitimate 
recordings, the Chinese government leaves a demand ‘that is currently primarily met by 
Chinese pirates.’” (quoting Neil Turkewitz, executive vice president of the Recording 
ra note 118, at 528–29. 
ORT, supra note 6, at 74. 
t 78. 
ter, supra note 118, at 542. 
er, supra note 107. 
Industry Association of America)).  
155  Hunter, sup
156  Id. at 530. 
157  USTR REP
158  Id. a
159  Id. 
160  Hun
161  Id. 
162  Sang
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erating its factories in China and does not want to jeopardize its 
manufacturing operation.172  Mr. Debrowski’s apology was made 
er things, that it would hold up applications of American com-
panies to set up businesses in China and would suspend talks with 
American automobile manufacturers over joint ventures.163  There 
was no suggestion of constructive dialogue or talks.  
 Indeed, when faced with crises over goods produced in 
China, the Chinese government typically takes an offensive stance.  
China’s response to manufacturing criticism during the summer of 
2007, when Mattel recalled twenty million toys manufactured in 
China,164 is particularly illustrative.  Part of the recall was due to 
excessive lead in the toys.165  In an August 14th conference call, 
Mattel laid the blame for the recall on a Chinese subcontractor who 
had violated Mattel’s policies by using paint from non-authorized 
third party suppliers.  Robert Eckert, the chairman and CEO of 
Mattel, elaborated on these accusations in his testimony before the 
Senate Committee on Appropriations,166 in which he stated that the 
vendors were not just careless, but also in some cases were delib-
erate in avoiding the requirements.167  On September 21, 2007, 
Thomas A. Debrowski, Mattel’s executive vice president for 
worldwide operation, met with Li Changjiang, the head of China’s 
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine.168  Mr. Li pointed out that a large part of Mattel’s 
profits comes from factories in China, and that China’s cooperation 
should be valued.169  Indeed, 65% of Mattel’s toys are manufac-
tured in China.170  Mr. Debrowski apologized to China for any 
harm caused to the reputation of Chinese manufacturers by the re-
calls.171  Dara O’Rourke, an associate professor at the University 
of California, Berkeley, speculated that Mattel is committed to op-
                                                 
163  Id. 
164  Graham, supra note 25; Louise Story, An Apology in China from Mattel, N.Y. 
supra note 25; Story, supra note 164. 
 
t 3. 
y, supra note 164. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at C1. 
165  Graham, 
166  Graham, supra note 25.
167  Id. a
168  Stor
169  Id.  
170  Id. 
171  Id.   
172  Id.   
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ct contaminated by lead.   Given what 
is p
eighty enough 
to deal with the problem of counterfeits.  There should be better 
oblem. 
AVAILABLE G THE NATIONAL 
 security threats.  Congress should make use of the 
Commission in monitoring the threats posed by intellectual prop-
hould Strengthen and Clarify the General 
                   
to appease Chinese manufacturers.  It came despite the fact that 
millions of toys were in fa  173
ublicly known, it appears that Mattel gave in to pressure from 
the Chinese government.  
What these responses make clear is that the United States can-
not rely on China to self-regulate or take actions w
U.S. mechanisms in place to manage this pr
III. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAKE BETTER USE OF ITS 
STATUTORY TOOLS IN ADDRESSIN
SECURITY THREAT POSED BY CHINA’S WEAK INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 
Congress and the executive branch should implement key 
statutory changes to monitor and address the national security 
threats posed by counterfeit goods.  First, the general provisions 
which facilitate U.S.-China relations should provide for strict 
monitoring of China’s enforcement of its intellectual property 
laws.  U.S. officials should also address the national security 
threats that develop because of counterfeits in the § 6951 reports 
and in U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission re-
ports and hearings.  Finally, CFIUS was created to identify poten-
tial national
erty theft.   
A. Congress S
Provisions of Title 22 Chapter 77—United States-China 
Relations 
The United States Code Title 22 Chapter 77174 lays out the 
statutory provisions for monitoring and enforcing U.S.-China rela-
tions, as well as the commissions responsible for oversight.  It is 
the principal statutory vehicle for regulating foreign relations be-
                              
  See id. (reporting that approximately 2.6 million toys were recalled due to lead paint 
being used). 
173
174  22 U.S.C §§ 6901–03, 6911–13, 6931, 6941–43, 6951, 6961–65, 6981–84, 6991, 
7001–02 (2006). 
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en the two states.  Congress should strengthen these provisions 
to specifically address intellectual property and its connection to 
national security. 
Congressional findings in this section address the trade in 
goods between the two nations and the increasing trade deficit.175  
However, despite the ever-growing market in pirated and counter-
feit goods from China, Congress does not address this fact.  The 
problem of intellectual property theft is so serious and pervasive 
that it should be among the general congressional findings on U.S.-
China relations in § 6901.  Its inclusion would serve as a signal to 
the Executive, who implements the statutory provisions, that it is 
an area that Congress deems serious enough to be addressed.  Ju
ongress deplores China’s violations of human rights, religious 
freedom and worker rights,176 it should deplore the intellectual 
property violations which gravely affect U.S. national security.   
In § 6902 the United States does seek to “pursue effective en-
forcement of trade-related and other international commitments by 
foreign governments.”177  The IP agreements signed by China 
could fall into the trade-related category.  However, the wording is 
rbroad, and intellectual property is not mentioned at all, much 
less the relationship between U.S. national security and IP.  Indeed, 
the primary objective of this section is to monitor human rights.178  
Congress calls for “an annual review . . . of the compliance by 
the People's Republic of China with its terms of accession to the 
WTO.”179  China has enacted the intellectual property treaties 
called for under the WTO agreement,180 but enforcement has been 
problematic, as was previously discussed.  It is very important that 
Congress clarify the meaning of the word “compliance.”181  The 
word is not defined in § 6903, where the definitions for Chapter 
77—U.S.-China Relations can be found.  Does “compliance” refer 
to China’s enactment of the appropriate laws, to their enforcement 
 
175  22 U.S.C. § 6901(4)–(5). 
176  Id. § 6901(12). 
177  Id. § 6902(2). 
178  Id. § 6902(5).  
179  Id. § 6931. 
180  See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.  
181  22 U.S.C. § 6931. 
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roperty 
com
with trade agreements in order for United States businesses, work-
or to both?  A clarification is especially needed for this section be-
cause it deals specifically with the monitoring and enforcement of 
China’s WTO commitments.  It should be made clear to China that 
at all times it will be monitored not just on the proper enactment of 
these laws, but also on their enforcement.  China, besides acceding 
to the intellectual property treaties, also joined several other rele-
vant trade treaties as part of its WTO commitments.  Considering 
the importance of intellectual property and the dangers that coun-
terfeit goods can pose to U.S. national security, this section should 
also specifically mention the monitoring of intellectual p
mitments, so that “WTO commitments” is not mistaken to 
mean exclusively, or principally, trade commitments.  The vague 
language of the section leaves little chance that national security 
will be addressed when these provisions are implemented.  
The meaning of “compliance” is expanded in §§ 6941 to 6943.  
Section 6941 deals with the congressional findings regarding com-
pliance with trade agreements.182  The section reads, in relevant 
part, “The United States Government must continue to be vigilant 
in monitoring and enforcing the compliance by our trading partners 
                                                 
182  Id. §
increase in ex-
lped fuel the longest economic expansion in United States his-
om the opportunities created by mar-
le opportunities for United 
ents on the accession of the People’s Republic of China to the 
WTO. 
 6941.  The Congress finds as follows: 
(1) The opening of world markets through the elimination of tariff 
and nontariff barriers has contributed to a 56-percent 
ports of United States goods and services since 1992.  
(2) Such export expansion, along with an increase in trade generally, 
has he
tory. 
(3) The United States Government must continue to be vigilant in 
monitoring and enforcing compliance by our trading partners with 
trade agreements in order for United States businesses, workers, and 
farmers to continue to benefit fr
ket-opening trade agreements.  
(4) The People’s Republic of China, as part of its accession to the 
World Trade Organization, has committed to eliminating significant 
trade barriers in the agricultural, services, and manufacturing sectors 
that, if realized, would provide considerab
States farmers, businesses, and workers.  
(5) For these opportunities to be fully realized, the United States 
Government must effectively monitor and enforce its rights under the 
agreem
Id. 
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ntion of enforcing intellectual property laws.  Busi-
nes
d therein lies the problem.  A 
cris
ed by forced or prison labor.   There is no com-
par
                                                
ers, and farmers to continue to benefit from the opportunities cre-
ated by market-opening trade agreements.”183  Whether “compli-
ance” here should be read as enactment of laws, enforcement of 
laws or both is again unclear.  A clue about the intention of these 
sections can be found in the immediately following paragraph, 
which states that China “has committed to eliminating significant 
trade barriers . . . that, if realized, would provide considerable op-
portunities for United States farmers, businesses, and workers.”184  
Read together, these two sections seem to be geared primarily to-
ward trade barriers, and “compliance” would most likely mean 
China’s elimination of trade barriers through enactment of laws. 
There is no me
ses and workers would benefit tremendously from clear con-
gressional statutory statements on combating the theft of intellec-
tual property.  
While the language in § 6941(3) and § 6941(5) could be used 
as a tool in demanding China’s enforcement of its intellectual 
property laws, it would be a stretch to state that Congress enacted 
these sections in response to counterfeits from China affecting U.S. 
interests and national security.  An
is as serious as that caused by Chinese counterfeits pouring into 
the United States needs clear words and clearer actions.  These are 
lacking in the United States Code.  
Statutorily, there is a prohibition on the importation of products 
from China creat 185
able prohibition on the importation of products created with 
child or slave labor, which is in fact how many counterfeit goods 
are produced.186 
Section 6943 laboriously sets aside money every fiscal year for 
monitoring China’s compliance with its WTO commitments and 
 
t
 young labor in developing countries to produce the copied 
183  Id. § 6941(3).  
184  Id. § 6941(4). 
185  Id. §§ 6941–65. 
186  See South Eas  Asia Investigations into Social and Humanitarian Activities 
(SISHA), SISHA NEWSL., Aug. 2007, available at http://www.sisha.org/ 
newsletter/newsletter_august.pdf (“The counterfeit goods trade relies upon exploitation 
of mostly poor and mostly
merchandise.”). 
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er, 
there is no explicit provision that intellectual property needs to be a 
s 
ft.  
 the Part of the Executive to Monitor the 
o fo-
cus
                                                
international trade obligations.187  Indeed, under § 6951, an annual 
report on compliance has to be submitted to Congress.  Howev
major part of this report, much less that the report needs to addres
the national security implications of intellectual property the
B. There is a Failure on
Potential National Security Threats Caused by China’s 
Intellectual Property Violations Through the 22 U.S.C. § 6951 
Report to Congress 
 The Executive is mandated to provide, on a yearly basis, a 
report to Congress addressing China’s compliance with its WTO 
obligations.188  In the past this report has thoroughly addressed the 
Chinese service industry and the import and export regulations, but 
has put little focus on intellectual property enforcement and n
 whatsoever on the national security implications of intellectual 
property theft.  In the 2006 Report to Congress on China’s WTO 
Compliance, national security is not mentioned even once.189 
In 2006, the report clearly stated that its focus is on trade con-
cerns and that it “does not provide an exhaustive analysis of the 
many areas in which China’s WTO compliance efforts have or 
have not . . . satisfied particular commitments.”190  One such area 
that lacks exhaustive analysis is intellectual property, to which a 
mere 8 out of 109 pages is dedicated.  The report has opportunities 
to address the intellectual property issue at greater length, but 
misses them.  According to a new Chinese development policy, 
foreign investors in the steel industry have to possess proprietary 
technology or intellectual property, but foreign investors are not 
allowed to have a controlling share in the industry.191  Therefore 
the technology requirement becomes a de facto intellectual prop-
erty transfer.192  The report’s conclusion on this issue is that the 
 
6943(b)(1). 
R REPORT, supra note 6. 
t 56. 
187  22 U.S.C. § 
188  Id. § 6951. 
189  See UST
190  Id. at 1. 
191  Id. a
192  Id. 
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 to analyze the U.S. national security implications of these 
tech
 “safe harbor” provisions for 
crim
hina and seized at U.S. 
borders, the report does not mention what portion of these goods 
cific 
                                                
policy contravenes WTO protectionism standards.193  The report 
fails
nology transfers.  The destination of the intellectual property 
of a heavily regulated and strategic industry should be of great 
concern to the U.S.; the report misses a key opportunity to discuss 
it.  
The report states that China has little success in enforcing its 
intellectual property laws;194 however, specific problems with en-
forcement do not receive an in-depth discussion.  Most of the dis-
cussion centers on the actions that the U.S. has taken to urge China 
to strengthen enforcement, including round table meetings, and 
IPR working groups,195 and IPR laws enacted by China.196  The 
only specific enforcement problem addressed is the faulty Chinese 
criminal prosecution system, which has such a high bar for in-
fringement that it creates de facto
inals.197  In only one line of the report is corruption mentioned 
as a factor in the counterfeit goods trade.198  The report does not 
expand on corruption at all and offers no discussion or data on how 
widespread the problem really is.   
Further, the report discusses only the most innocuous infring-
ing goods.  The report mentions the piracy of operating system 
software,199 music and movies.200  The piracy of controlled tech-
nology is not mentioned at all, and of course, a look into the na-
tional implications of this piracy is also missing.  The serious 
health risk posed by counterfeit pharmaceuticals is touched on in 
only one line, without further elaboration.201  Despite claiming to 
have figures on counterfeit goods made in C
are fake drugs.202  Overall, the report fails to address spe
 
193  Id. 
194  Id. at 70.  
195  Id. at 77. 
196  Id. at 70. 
197  Id. at 78. 
198  Id. at 71. 
199  Id. at 74. 
200  Id. at 76. 
201  Id. at 75. 
202  See id. at 78. 
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in t
ship between the United States and the People’s Republic of 
Chi
ilitary competition or actions;  
the 
mentioned at all in the mandat
threats posed by counterfeit Chinese goods and specific obstacles 
he enforcement of these laws in China.  
C. Congress Should Strengthen the Provisions of 22 U.S.C. § 
7002—U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
to Address Intellectual Property  
In 2000 Congress created the U.S.-China Economic and Secu-
rity Review Commission (“USCC”).203  The USCC is tasked with 
monitoring, investigating and reporting to Congress on “the na-
tional security implications of the bilateral trade and economic re-
lation
na.”204  National security problems caused by counterfeit goods 
from China would certainly fall under this mandate.  And so, this 
commission would be an ideal vehicle to conduct a thorough 
analysis of the effect that counterfeit goods have on national secu-
rity. 
The USCC is also mandated to submit an annual report to 
Congress.205  The minimum contents of this report reveal the focus 
of this commission.  At a minimum the report has to contain: a dis-
cussion of China’s trade, transfer and acquisition of military sys-
tems, or systems which could be used for military purposes;206 
China’s intentions in pursuing m 207
effects of China’s currency manipulations;208 actions taken by 
China in the context of the WTO;209 China’s patterns of invest-
ment;210 and whether or not the trade surplus enhances China’s 
military budget.211  Intellectual property considerations are not 
e. 
                                                 
203  22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2006).  The USCC was created on October 30, 2000, through the 




Floyd D. Spence Nati
http://www.uscc.gov/about/ove
204  22 U.S.C. § 7002(b)(2). 
205  Id. § 7002(c)(1). 
206  Id. § 7002(c)(2)(A)–(
207  Id. § 7002(c)(2)(E)–(
208  Id. § 7002(c)(2)(F). 
209  Id. § 7002(c)(2)(G). 
210  Id. § 7002(c)(2)(H). 
211  Id. § 7002(c)(2)(I). 
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arrow and traditional definition of 
nati
wledge and experience of the panel, the USCC should 
hav
It is no small wonder that in the USCC’s 2007 Report to Con-
gress, intellectual property is only mentioned seven times.212  This 
is so despite the fact that the USCC listed counterfeiting and piracy 
as one of the eight factors that serve as major drivers of China’s 
economy213 and as a major contributor to the growing U.S. trade 
deficit with China.214  The effects of intellectual property viola-
tions on the field of national security are not discussed at all in the 
final report.  When the Commission does briefly discuss intellec-
tual property, it is only to mention that Chinese businesses have 
been actively seeking Hong Kong as their legal jurisdiction be-
cause it provides better legal protection and enforcement of IP 
rights than mainland China.215  This silence is ironic because the 
USCC’s report to Congress already must address national security 
issues relating to China because it must report on China’s military 
advances.216  A brief yearly analysis of the effects of counterfeits 
from China would not only fall under the letter of the law,217 but 
also under its spirit of ensuring the security of the United States. 
The USCC seems trapped by a n
onal security, which focuses primarily on military threats.  The 
national security threats posed by intellectual property violations 
are not as obvious, but they should be included in the future con-
siderations of national security.  
  Finally, the recommendations of the report are perhaps the 
greatest disappointment of the document.  The recommendations 
do not mention intellectual property at all.218  Considering the 
depth of kno
e offered something more useful than just recommending that 
the U.S. urge Chinese officials to be as forthcoming as possible to 
“prevent . . . anxieties [from] swell[ing] into adversarial inclina-
tion[s].”219  
                                                 
212  See U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS, June 1, 
2007 [hereinafter USCC REPORT], available at http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/ 
full_07.pdf.  
t 2.  
07 and accompanying text. 
EPORT, supra note 212, at 5–6.  
annual_report_
213  Id. a
214  Id. 
215  USCC REPORT, supra note 212, at 19.  
216  See supra notes 206–
217  See supra note 209. 
218  USCC R
219  Id. at 5. 
VOL19_BOOK1_NASTASE 12/2/2008  6:20:52 PM 
2008] CHINESE COUNTERFEITS & U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 173 
e date and intellectual property.”   The report 
goe
ing that China can in fact en-




China pose to U.S. national security. 
(“FDI”)  in the United States.  The Committee must “determine 
                                                
Oddly enough, the USCC seems to be perfectly aware of the 
national security implications of piracy and counterfeits.  In July of 
2007, the USCC held hearings on China’s proliferation of sensitive 
technology.220  Representative Duncan Hunter discussed a 2006 
Institute for Defense Analysis report which found that Chinese 
companies advertise their reverse engineering capabilities aimed at 
recovering “sensitiv 221
s on to mention that several Pentagon projects have been af-
fected by counterfeit microelectronics from China.  A panel later 
discussed the importance of assessing the Department of Defense 
programs and microchips that could be put at risk by intellectual 
property theft.222   
While the USCC did not directly address China’s lackadaisical 
enforcement of copyrights in its hearings, Commissioner Michael 
Wessel did point out that despite the rampant copyright infringe-
ment taking place in China, the Olympic mascot has yet to be 
counterfeited,223 thereby coyly imply
not appropriate to congressional reviews.  Clear statements 
needed.  These scattered references cannot form a compelling b
for addressing the threat that intellectual property vi
D. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
Should be Used to Analyze the Potential National Security 
Threats Caused by Intellectual Property Violations 
1. What is CFIUS? 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(“CFIUS”) is an interagency committee chaired by the Secretary of 
Treasury and tasked with reviewing Foreign Direct Investment 
224
 
 note 144. 
22. 
s-Border Deal the 
 L. TODAY 31 (2007).  
220  Proliferation, supra
221  Id. at 103–04. 
222  Id. at 120–
223  Id. at 19. 
224  Ilene Knable Gotts, Leon Greenfield & Perry Lange, Is Your Cros
Next National Security Lightning Rod?, 16 BUS.
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 finds that the 
tran
e unilaterally initiated by the President or the Com-
mit
or the President to 
dea w
                                                
the effects of [an FDI] transaction on the national security of the 
United States.”225  FDI covers “any merger, acquisition, or take-
over that is proposed or pending . . . by or with any foreign power 
which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in in-
terstate commerce in the United States.”226  If CFIUS
saction “could result in the control of any person engaged in 
interstate commerce in the United States by a foreign government 
or an entity controlled or acting on behalf of a foreign govern-
ment,227 the Committee conducts an investigation.228 
Parties generally file a voluntary written notice in which they 
must particularly identify any sensitive technologies or information 
that the entity possesses.229  This is prudent for two reasons.  First, 
review may b
tee.230  Second, the law empowers CFIUS to dissolve a merger 
or acquisition at any time in the future if a filing has not been 
made, regardless of whether or not the acquisition or merger is 
complete.231  
If the President finds that there is credible evidence that the 
foreign entity seeking control might take actions that threaten the 
national security of the United States,232 and no other laws can 
provide adequate and appropriate authority f
l ith this matter,233 he may “suspend or prohibit any covered 
transaction that threatens to impair the national security of the 
United States.”234  The President’s choice to suspend or prohibit a 
transaction is not subject to judicial review.235 
 Several of the factors that CFIUS takes into account for na-
tional security requirements can be applied in the field of intellec-
 
170(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006). 
generally proven to be fatal to an investment deal. See, e.g., Gotts et al., supra 




225  50 U.S.C. app. § 2
226  Id. § 2170(a)(3). 
227  Id. § 2170(a)(4). 
228  Id. § 2170(b)(1)(B).  Even when these investigations allow a deal to go through, 
they have 
note 224. 
229  50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(C)(i)
230  50 U.S.C. app. § 2
231  Id. § 2170(d)(3). 
232  Id. § 2170(d)(4)(A). 
233  Id. § 2170(d)(4)(B
234  Id. § 2170(d)(1
235  Id. § 2170(e). 
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ation the potential national security 
imp
FIUS’s approval, Dubai Port World formally 
asked the U.S. government to conduct a full forty-five-day investi-
nsac-
lic outcry 
                                                
tual property.  For example, the Commission may review the po-
tential effect of the proposed transaction on the sale of military 
goods or technology.236  This covers instances where a foreign na-
tion’s lack of intellectual property protection can lead to the prolif-
eration of technological secrets.  Factor five of a CFIUS review 
takes into consideration the effect that the proposed transaction 
would have on United States technological leadership,237 while 
factor seven takes into consider
lications of critical U.S. technologies.238  Indeed, CFIUS, as a 
matter of course, is particularly interested in transactions in which 
the U.S. entity has export-controlled technology, or technologies 
critical to national defense.239  
CFIUS emerged from obscurity in February 2006, when it 
scrutinized and approved Dubai Port World’s acquisition of U.S. 
port leases.240  Under the deal, Dubai Port World, a company con-
trolled by the government of the United Arab Emirates, was to be 
contracted to manage six American ports.241  In response to the up-
roar caused by C
gation.242  Although this investigation also approved the tra
tion, the deal later collapsed in the face of enormous pub
and opposition.243 
2. The Executive Should Make Better Use of CFIUS in 
Reviewing the National Security Implications of 
Intellectual Property Theft 
By scrutinizing foreign investment deals for national security 
threats, CFIUS is in a great position to monitor the intellectual 
 
236  Id. § 2170(f)(4). 
237  Id. § 2170(f)(5). 
238  Id. § 2170(f)(7). 
239  Gotts et al., supra note 224. 
240  Id.  
241  Sheryl Stolberg, How a Business Deal Became a Big Liability for Republicans in 
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at A14. 
242  David Sanger, Dubai Deal Will Undergo Deeper Inquiry into Security, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 27, 2006, at A15. 
243  Jim Rutenberg, Bush Set to Approve Takeover of 9 Military Plants by Dubai, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, at A20. 
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 role in the national security debate.  The FDI transac-
tion
product integration, all of which could be used 
to a
Chinese military.251 
       
property trends of various nations as well as the national security 
implications of those trends.  If a foreign entity is known to offer 
weak IP protection of sensitive technologies, then CFIUS can stop 
the acquisition from taking place and monitor the trend of intellec-
tual property protection in that nation.  CFIUS is taking a more 
prominent
s notified for national security review in 2006 more than dou-
bled over the 2004 level to 113 transactions.244  Also, in 2006, a 
total of seven forty-five-day investigations were launched, which 
was as many as had been initiated in the prior five years com-
bined.245 
In light of Representative Duncan’s statement246 before the 
USCC, which indicated that Chinese companies advertise their re-
verse engineering capabilities, it is not surprising that CFIUS 
would hear alarm bells when faced with deals that could pour pro-
tected U.S. technologies into the underground counterfeit bazaar.   
Past CFIUS reviews show that the Committee is in a prime po-
sition to flag FDI deals with foreign entities that do not give ade-
quate protection to intellectual property.  In 2005 Lenovo of China 
made a bid to buy IBM’s personal computer business.247  CFIUS 
investigated the deal because of a potential for industrial espionage 
and the risk that transferred technology would be used for military 
purposes.248  Among the technologies which were at risk were bat-
tery, encryption and 
dvance China’s military capabilities.249  CFIUS also launched a 
forty-five-day investigation in 2003 when Hutchison Whampoa 
Ltd. made a bid for telecommunications giant Global Crossing.250  
Hutchison Whampoa was commonly known to have ties to the 
                                          
s et al., supra note 224. 
 Lenovo Proposal a Threat to National Security?, N.Y. 
n. 31, 2005, at C6. 
s et al., supra note 224. 
244  Gott
245  Id. 
246  See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
247  Steve Lohr, Is I.B.M.’s
TIMES, Ja
248  Id. 
249  Id. 
250  Gott
251  Id. 
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tion
al security, especially when 
China is involved.   Congress should extend the mandate of 
CFIUS and use its resources to monitor the national security impli-
cations of intellectual prop
 Besides the Dubai Port World deal, the largest CFIUS fire-
storm was triggered in 2005 when the Chinese firm CNOOC made 
a bid for the U.S. oil firm Unocal.252  The deal primarily raised 
fears over energy security.253  The critical components of Unocal 
were its crude oil reserves, located in Southeast Asia, and the tech-
nology used in certain blends of gasoline.254  The argument over 
the deal became so heated that Congress passed several resolutions 
declaring that the acquisition would threaten U.S. national secu-
rity.255  Congress went so far as to threaten to use its Article I 
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations to block the 
deal.256  Although these investigations proved fatal to the acquisi-
s, all still received the green light from CFIUS.  In only one 
case did the President exercise his power to block a deal: a 1990 
acquisition of a U.S. aerospace manufacturer by a Chinese firm.257  
What this history of investigations makes clear is that serious 




The illusion that the trade in counterfeits is a victimless 
crime—that at worst harms wealthy CEOs in the luxury goods or 
entertainment industries259—is far from the truth.  Chinese intel-
lectual property theft leads to dangerous drugs, fake currency, a 
                                                 
252  Id. 
253  Steve Lohr, Who’s Afraid of China Inc.?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, at 31 [hereinaf-
ter Lohr, Who’s Afraid]. 
254  Gotts et al., supra note 224. 
255  Lohr, Who’s Afraid, supra note 253, at 31.  The outcry was so universal that Repre-
sentative Richard Pombo’s resolution passed 398 to 15.  Investors in CNOOC were also 
opposed to the deal.  Investment bank William Blair & Company sold its $160 million 
stake in CNOOC over fears that the company’s moves were directed too much by the 
Chinese government, and not a sense of capitalism and profit. Id.  
256  See id. 
257  Gotts et al., supra note 224. 
258  Lohr, Who’s Afraid, supra note 253. 
259  See Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 2–3 (statement of Sen. Susan M. 
Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs). 
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to the United 
Sta s
 6951 reports to Congress and 
hearings before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission.  Finally, Congress should make use of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Investment in the United States to monitor threats 
posed by intellectual property theft. 
 
distrust of American products, the financing of criminal organiza-
tions and the proliferation of sensitive technologies.  These coun-
terfeit goods pose a direct national security threat 
te .  This threat may have been overlooked in part because of a 
narrow, traditional definition of national security.  In several in-
stances, however, Congress has allowed for a broad interpretation 
of national security to give the U.S. maximum protection. 
 Congress and the Executive should implement several statu-
tory changes aimed at monitoring and addressing the national secu-
rity threats posed by counterfeit goods from China.  The general 
provisions which facilitate U.S.-China relations should provide for 
strict and detailed monitoring of China’s enforcement of its intel-
lectual property laws.  Potential national security threats caused by 
counterfeits should be analyzed in §
